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After discussing ownership issues related to  prevent the market from solving allocation tropical forests, Deacon develops a simple  problems.
general equilibrium model to represent - at
least in a stylized way - the salient aspects of  Simple, direct solutions to deforestation and the deforestation process. He uses the model to  other enviromnental problems are unavailable, generate first- and second-best policy options for  but an ability to understand the environmental controlling deforestation and, later, to assess the  and welfare consequences of policies adopted for environmental consequences of government  other reasons is useful - if only to help policy- policies often cited in the literature on deforesta-  makers avoid mistak-es  that would otherwise go tion.  unrecognized.
Property rights, though important for under-  The model Deacon develops for this purpose standing the process of tropical deforestation, do  is highly stylized and intended primarily to not necessarily point to a sirnple or straightfor-  provide a systematic way of thinking about the ward fix for environmental problems, particu-  environmnental  and welfare effects of government larly in developing countries.  policy - for example, by considering pattems of
substitution among inputs and outputs, in cases The sheer size, communal nature of service  where an environmental resource to which flows, and pervasiveness of individual access to  people have free access is exploited. tropical forests make monitoring and enforce-
ment costly in some situations and unimaginable  If the use of first-best policies is infeasible in others. Redefining nominal rights in ways that  -whether  because of monitoring costs, appear to correct inefficiencies may yield gains  transboundary effects, or other reasons - then it in some cases, but an approach to environmental  becomes important to have detailed knowledge protection that leans heavily on this prescription  of pattems of substitution and complementarity seems aimed more at symptoms than at causes,  among ordinary inputs and environmental says Deacon.  resources, and information on the use of various
environmental resources in the production of Moreover, policy approaches based on the  specific goods and services. Knowledge of such use of Pigovian taxes or marketable permit  factors can permit policymakers to pursue policy schemes may yield efficiency gains in some  goals in situations where first-best instruments cases, h-  such approaches generally involve the  are unavailable.
same..  .itoring and enforcement problems that
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the  Bank. An objective of the series is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterCONTROLLING  TROPICAL  DEFORESTATION:  AN  ANALYSIS  OF
ALTERNATIVE  POLICIES
Robert  T. Deacon
Address  for  correspondence:
Department  of Economics
University  of California
Santa  Barbara,  CA 93106
(805) 893-3679
An expanded  treatment  of property rights issues  as they relate to tropical
deforestaton is presented in an earlier working paper, referenced as Deacon,
January 6, 1992,  in the  bibliography.  An earlier version  of this analysis  was  circulated
under the  title "Government  Policy  and Environmental  Quality  in Developing  Countries:
Complements  or Substitutes". The World Bank  provided  support for this research,
but bears no responsibility  for the  views expressed. I benefiKted  from conversations
with Roger  Sedjo. Valuable  comments  from Gunnar Eskeland,  William  Hyde,  Emmanuel
Jimenez,  Charles  Kolstad,  Dean  Lueck,  and  seminar  partcipants  at the  World Bank  are
gratefully acknowledged.Table  of Contents
Govemment  Policy  and Environmental  Quality:
A Simple Framework  2
Assumptions  and Definitions  4
Equilibrum  and Efficiency  6
First-  and Second-Best  Policy  Options  8
Discussion  1  5
Applications  1  7
The Cost of Converting  the Environmental  Resource  18
Policies  that After  the Mix  of Final  Products  24
Policies  that Alter  the Mix  of Inputs  28
Conclusions  31
Appendix  33
Bibliography  36CONTROLLING  TROPICAL  DEFORESTATION:  AN  ANALYSIS  OF
ALTERNATIVE  POLICIES
Government policies often have environmental consequences  that
apparently are  unintended  and unrecognized  by policy makers.  While this is
true  generally, the effect of government on tropical forests in developing
countries has drawn specific attention.  Such familiar economic development
strategies as tax incentives  for investment  and trade protection for domestic
industries have been cited as culprits in this process, particularly when the
policies favor mines, lumber mills, and land intensive agriculture.
Deforestation and other forms of environmental harm are also traced to
such seemingly innocuous  government actions as road building, flood control,
and the structure chosen for taxes and royalties.'  To date these claims have
largely emerged from case studies  and descriptive accounts. Systematic
empirical analysis,  with quantification  and hypothesis  testing, has been the
exception rather than the rule. 2 While the case study approach is useful in
identifying  issues and formulating hypotheses,  the absence  of an explicit
conceptual framework leaves unclear both the underlying assumptions and
the range of application  for  any conclusions reached.
The present paper takes steps toward such a framework.  Following a
brief discussion of ownership issues as they relate to tropical forests, a
1  Important  collections  of  this  work,  as it relates  to  developing  countries,  are  Repetto  and  Gillis
(1988)  and  Schramm  and  Warford  (1989).  Stavins  and  Jaffe  (1990)  provide  an  application  to
farm  policy  in  the  U.S.  and  Panayotou  and  Sungsuwan  (1990)  present  an  analysis  of
deforestation  in  Thailand.
2Stavins  and  Jaffe  (1990)  and  Panayotou  and  Sungsuwan  (1990)  are important  exceptions.
Lopez  (1992)  reports  empirical  results  for a  closely  related  phenomenon,  the  effect  of  common
land  ownership  on  land  use  and  agricultural  practices.simple general equilibrium model is developed to represent, at least in a
stylized way, the salient aspects of the deforestation process.  The model is
used to generate first-  and second-best policy options for controlling
deforestation and, later, to assess the environmental consequences  of
government policies often cited in the deforestation literature.
Government  PoHcy  and  Environmental  Quality:  A  Simple
Framework
Modern welfare economics  connects  the attainment  of efficiency  to the
existen1ce  of markets.  Markets, in turn, require the transfer of ownership
and this cannot proceed unless ownership rights are defined and enforced.
The nature of many environmental resources and the 'technology'  of
consuming  their services often makes ownership difficult or  impossible  to
practice.  Since mutually  beneficial  trades do not occur in such cases, some of
the costs and benefits of using  these resources are external to the user.3
In the case of tropical forests, the benefits of preservation are poorly
reflected in market allocations  because many of the services they provide
extend  far beyond  the borders of the host country.  The capacity  to absorb
carbon dioxide is a clear example,  and the benefits of biodiversity and the
value of the genetic pool in developing new medicines,  crops, and pest control
agents may fall into this category as well.  If transaction costs in such goods
and services were negligible, the market equilibrium would be characterized
3The  lIterature  on  tropical  deforestation  is sprinkled  with  references  to  the  function  of
property  rights.  See,  for example,  Mendelsohn  (1990),  Hyde,  et  al (1990),  and  Sedpo  (1990a
and  1990b).  An  extended  discussion  of  property  rights  Issues  and  government  policy  related
to tropical  deforestation  appears  in  Deacon  (1992).  Lopez  (1992)  presents  empirical  evidence
on  the  degree  to which  common  ownership  of land  in  the  Ivory  Coast  succeeds  in  avoiding  the
wastes  associated  with  free  access.
2by a substantial  volume of trade in environmental goods and services, with
owners of tropical forests exporting them abroad in return for payment from
all who benefit. The fact that such services, once provided, become  available
for all tk; consume, rules out such trade - a familiar 'free rider'
phenomenon. 4 In such cases, it Is customary to recommend  a Pigovian  tax or
subsidy to correct  the inefficiency.
Implementing  a first-best  Pigovian  tax to correct  an externality
requires the regulator to measure use of the resource and to levy a fee to
enforce compliance. Yet it is often the difficulty of these tasks that causes
market faiPure  and invites government involvement  in the first place, so
implementation  cannot be taken for granted.  The following analysis
emphasizes  second-best policies, instruments that do not require direct
measurement or  management  of the misallocated  resource.  Rather, they
influence  its use indirectly, by manipulating  the costs of inputs needed  to use it
and by exploiting patterns of complementarity  &rid substitution. The same
genera: framework is aiao useful for assessing the environmental impacts of
policies adopted for purposes unrelated to the environment.
The following model is related to the contributions of Sandmo  (1976)
and, particularly, Wiikander (1985).5 The latter author's simplifying
assumptions  of separable utility and linear production are  largely
maintained. The model departs from these predecessors by treating the
4GIllis  and  Repetto  (1988,  p.395)  briefly  acknowledge  this  point.  Fisher  and  Hanemann  (1991)
discuss  the  binefits,  both  local  and  global,  that  standing  tropical  forests  provide.  See  Peters,  et
al  (1989)  for a  delineation  of  glocar  benefits.
5See  Eskeland  and  Jimenez  (1990,  pp.24-27)  for  an  efficient  summnary  of  this  work.  As  noted  in
the  following  discussion,  the  model  presented  here  is  broadly  simlar  to one  developed  by
Lopez  and  Niklitschek  (1991).  In  their  specication,  the  good  characterized  by  market  failure  is
a  factor  of production  in  the  local  economy,  which  contrasts  with  the  structure  adopted  here.
Also,  Lopez  and  Nlklitschek  (1991)  explickitly  consider  dynamic  aspe._ts  of  allocating  the
communally  owned  resource.
3misallocated  good as an environmental resource that can either be left In its
natural state, in which case it provides a consumption  benefit but is subject to
free accesa. :-  converted to a market input. Attention  is directed toward
actions that yield environmental improvements and marginal welfare gains,
when starting from an unregulated equilP,rium.
Assumptions  and Definitions
A brief, stylized description of the model economy will make the analysis
that follows more concrete.  A tropical forest, when left in its natural state,
provides some benefits  that are  rival in consumption,  such as food and
shelter, and others that are nonrival, such as absorption of greenhouse
gasses. The forest itself is modeled  as a free access resource, so those who
wish to do so can convert it to a market input, such as cropland for shifting
agriculture, pasture for  grazing cattle, or timber for  lumber production.
Deforestation involves private costs for clearing land or  harvesting timber.
These private costs exclude the foregone consumption  benefit the forest
provides while standing 6.
The economy of the country that contains  the forest produces two sorts
of outputs  - those that require the converted forest as an input and those
that do not.  These  differences are captured by two consumption  goods, e.g.,
agriculture, which uses cleared forestland as an input, and manufacturing,
6Many  cultures  own  forestlands  in  common;  see  Deacon  (1992)  for  a brief  dscussion.  An
important  question  is  whether  the  equilibrium  with  commno,n  ownership  is  closer  to the  open
access  outcome  or the  complete  markets  alternative.  Lopez  (1992)  presents  empirical
evidence  on  this  general  question  as  it  applies  to  the  use  of communally  owned  bush-fallow
biomass  in  the  Ivory  Coast.  According  to  his  estimates,  only  a  fraction  of  the  resource's
community-wide  value  Is  internalized  in  decisions  regarding  Its  use.
4which does not. 7 In addition both consumption  goods, plus the process of
converting the forest, use the economy's  other Input, labor, the aggregate
supply of which is fixed.
With this metaphor in mind, consider an econ,my populated  by identical
individuals,  each of whom takes relevant prices as given.  Equilibrium
allocations  in this economy are equivalent  to utility maximizing  choices  of a
single representative consumer.  The individual  gains utility from
consumption  of three goods, X, Y, and 0.  Property rights are defined and
enforced for the first two, so markets and prices exist. No market exists  for
0, however, the service flow of the free access resource.  Although  the
quality of 0  is affected  by the aggregate choices of all individuals,  the number
of agents  is sufficiently large that each regards it as given.
The individual's  utility is
W = U(X)  + Y + V(Q)  (1)
where U(-) and V(-) are strictly concave. If 0  is the utility flow from a tropical
forest, then V(Q) includes non-excludable  benefits of biodiversity, erosion
cor,trol, and absorption of greenhouse gasses.
Production of X, which may be considered agriculture, requires both
labor and an input obtained by converting some of the environmental
resource.  The amount converted is P, and feasible levels  of 0 and P are
limited by the environmental constraint
Q+P=1.  (2)
For tropical forests, useful proxies for 0 and P might be the amounts  of
forested and deforested acreage.  The production function for X is
7These  examples  are metaphorical,  intended  to aid  the Intuftion  and to provide concreteness  to
an otherwise vague distinction. The actual  environmental  consequences  of producing diterent
consumption  goods obviously  Is more complex.
5x  :'- X(LX, P)*  )
where Lx is labor used to produce X, and X(.) is concave  with positive
marginal products.  Both Lx and P are assumed  to be normal inputs. The
production function for Y is
Y = aLy  (4)
where  Ly is labor used to produce Y and a is its marginal product.
The process of converting 0  may involve cutting forests, draining
wetlands, and so forth, and requires some of the economy's  labor.
Conversion is described by
p = aP p(5)
where LP is labor allocated  to converting 0  into P and a/5 is its marginal
product.
The labor available  to the economy is limited by
LX  + LY  + LP =1  (6)
which implies
Y = cc  _-(aLx + 3P).  (7)
As noted later, the expression in parentheses in (7) is the total 'private' cost of
producing X, expressed in units of Y foregone.
Combining  equations (1), (2), (3), and (7), the individual's  utility is
W = U(X(LX,  P))  +  a  - (aLX  + ,P) + V(1 P).  (8)
The concavity assumptions  adopted earlier, together with the linearity of (7),
guarantee that (8) is strictly concave and hence has a unique  global maximum.
Equilibrium and Efficiency
Those  who convert 0 to P face no opportunity cost to reflect the fact that
this act reduces the environmental  quality available  to others.  The
6equilibrium allocation in this setting is found by maximizing  (8) with respect to
Lx and P, treating  V(1-P) as fixed. It is useful to break this problem into two
parts.  Doing so separates the environmental  effect of a reallocation of
resources into two components,  the effect of a change in the mix of inputs used
in production and the effect of a change in the mix of final outputs.
First consider the individual's  nroblem of producing X at minimum  cost.
The Lagrange equation for this problem is
L  =  aLX +  iP.  + g(X - X(LX,P))  (9)
and the first-order  conditions are
a-AXL  =  (10)
- 4p=0,  (11)
where partial derivatives are  denoted with subscripts.  Combining  these
conditions  with (3), the private cost minimizing  input demands are
Lx =LX(a,  ,B  X)  (12)
P =  P(a, J,B  X).  (13)
Inserting these functions  into the cost equation (9) yields the 'private' cost
function
C=C(a,  ,B,X).  (14)
The terms a and ,  are effective  prices for Lx and P, where foregone Y
is the unit of account. This private cost of X is less than the social cost, since
the price the individual  pays for  P does not include any cbarge for
environmental  damage. The cost function in (14) is concave in the two prices,
and derivatives of C( ) with respect to these prices give the cost minimizing
input demands. Additionally,  the Lagrange m'.  plier  p. in (10) and (11), when
evaluated  at the prices faced by the individual, equals  the marginal private
cost of X; that is
W(a,  J, X) = Cx(a,  3,  X).  (15)
7Substituting  the cost function  (14)  into (8) gives  the following  expression
for utility
W = U  (X)  + a - C(a. P,.  X)  + V(1-P(a, 3,  X)).  (16)
The individual  chooses  X to maximize  (16),  taking  V as given. In the
unregulated  equilibrium,  then,
U=  Cx(a,  1,  X),  (17)
and the marginai  benefit  of consuming  X equals  its marginal  private  cost.
The  welfare  optimum  is found by maximizing  (8) with  respect  to Lx and
P.  The first-order conditions  for this problem  are
UXXL=a  (18)
UxXp  = , + Vo  (19)
where VQ  is the marginal  utility  of the environmental  resource.
To  allow  comparison  to the private  optimum,  substitute  t for Ox In (17)
and insert  the result into (10)  and (11). This  yields  the following  conditions  for
the private  optimum
UXXL  =a  (1Oa)
UxXp=  (11  a)
Comparing  (1  la) and  (19) shows  that the competitive  solution  is inefficient
because  it causes  P to be excessive.  This  inefficiency  is exhibited  in the
economy  in two ways. First,  the mix of L.puts  used  to produce  X is incorrect;  P
is used  too intensively  in the productlon  of X.  Second,  because  P is under-
priced,  the marginal  cost of X relative  to Y is too low.
First- and Second-Best  Policy Options
The  competitive  equilibrium  is inefficient  because  no market exists  for
servJces  provided  by the environment.  It is well-known  that an efficiet  it
allocation  can be achieved  in this circumstance  if a properly computed  tax is
8levied on the use of the unmarketed good. In effect, the tax plays  the role that
would otherwise be filled by the missing  price, and restores the allocation that
would be achieved  if markets wern complete. 8 Such 'first-best' policies are
seldom adopted, how(ver, and the cost of  monitoring that would be needed  to
enforce a tax policy is one important reason. 9
This suggests  that one examine  second-best policies, instruments that
do not require direct monitoring of the environmental resource.  The
second-best instruments.considered  consist of taxes and subsidies on the
inputs and oitputs defined in the model economy. Since there are four
separate commodities,  X,Y,LX,  and P, and hence  three relative prices, three
separate tax instruments are  available.1 0
Tax rates on P, X, and Lx are denoted  -x,  ;,  and X, respectively. It Is
convenient  to specify  these levies  as per unit taxes on P and Lx and an ad
valorem tax on X; hence
Rx  = xP;  RX  = XLX;  RC  = (C( ).  (20)
8The  same  outcome  can  be  obtained  by  issuing  an  appropriate  number  of transferable  permits
for  the  use  of Q. Competitive  trade  in  permits  results  in  an  equilibrium  permit  price  that  mimics
the  corrective  tax.
9  The  preceding  model  does  not  incorporate  monitoring  and  other  transaction  costs  and  is,
strictly  speaking,  applicable  for  policy  analysis  only  if  the  Implementing  agency  can  monitor  the
policy's  provisions  at  negligible  cost.  If  the  agency  is  unable  to monitor,  or  .an  do  so  only  at
significant  cost,  then  the  first-best  tax  is  infeasible.  A  tax  might  still  be  the  best  policy  available,
but  one  would  need  to broaden  the  present  model  to incorporate  monitoring  and  enforcement
costs  before  deciding.
10There  are,  as  well,  two  addiional  uses  of labor,  LY  and  LP.  Since  the  technologies  for
producing  Y and  P are  linear,  however,  taxing  these  final  goods  is  equivalent  to taxing  the  inputs
used  to  produce  them.  Subsidies  are  incorporated  into  the  analysis  via  negative  tax  rates.  As
shown  in  the  following  section,  the  range  of policy  options  to which  this  analysis  applies  Is
broader  than  the  taxes  and  subsidies  explickly  modeled.  A quota  on  production  of a  good  or
use  of  an  input  Is  equivalent  to a  tax  on  the  good  accompanied  by  a particular  distribution  of  tax
revenue.  Similarly,  a  price  ceiling  or floor  will  cause  the  same  realiocation  as  a  tax  on  the
controlled  iem,  In  this  case  accompanied  by  a particular  distribution  of  the  rent  generated  by
the  control.
9All tax revenues are rebated to the consumer  in lump sum fashion. When
these features are incorporated into the utility function,  it becomes
W = U(X) + a - (1+Q)C(a  + X,  3  + x, X)
+ V(1-P(a + X, B  + x, X)) + RX  + RA  + RR.  (21)
First-Best Policy:  A Tax on P.  It is instructive to demonstrate how the
first-best policy of taxing P alone achieves  the welfare optimum In this set-up.
When n is imposed  the indMidual's  choice of X satisfies
UX  = Cx(a, 1  + 7r,  X),  (22)
and cost minimizing  choices  of inputs Lx and P satisfy
a/XL = (P + 7[)/XP  =  L(al,  1 + R, X).  (23)
Recalling  that  g(ac,  , + n, X) = Cx(c, ,  + rc,  X), the preceding two conditions
imply
UXXL  = a  and  UxXp=3 +R.  (24)
Comparing (24) to (18) and (19)  it is clear that setting x equal to V< achieves
the welfare maximum.
Even if the optimal  tax rate is unknown,  a small posiftive  tax on P
necessarily improves welfare over the level reached in the competitive
equilibrium.  Examining  (22), the consumer's choice of X can be written X =
X(a, 1  + ,i).  Insert this expression into (21), differentiate with respect to x, and
evaluate  at X =  =  = 0. The result is
aw/ax  = (Ux - CX)aX/a1 - ac/an
- voiap/a  + (aP/ax)ax//}  + P
= - v0{aP/af  + (aP/aX)aX/aXc,  (25)
since Ux = Cx at the untaxed  equilibrium and  ac/a  = P by duality.
10The expression in brackets in (25)  can be interpreted more easily by
inserting the consumer's optimal choice of X into the demand function  for  P.
The result is
P = P(a, P3  + ir, X(a, Pa  + X)).  (26)
Differentiating with respect to X yields
dP/dx  = aP/k  + (a*/aX)aX/a  (27)
which is the expression in brackets in (25).  Hence, MW/an  is positive  if dP/di
is negative. The first term on the right-hand side of (27), aP/ax,  is the
derivative of the demand for P with respect to its own price and is necessarily
negative. This is termed an input  substitution  effect. The remaining terms on
the right-hand side of (27) constitute  an output substitution  effect. Since P is
normal ZP/aX is positive, and it is easy to show that normality of P implies
/axi is negative." 1 Together, then, these results imply DW/  > 0 in a
neighborhood of the unregulated equilibrium.
There is an elasticity version of (27)  that is useful in applications. This
expression, derived in the Appendix,  is
dP  P  P2 X  cmL dn  28
=  ={O  + W4X)  O)P((a  (28)
where  5  is the own price elasticity  of demand  for P, <  is the elasticity  of
demand for P with respect to output, 4p  is the cost share of P in production of
X, and a and q are price elasticities  of supply  and demand  for X.  Given any
proportionate tax x/j3, the proportionate reduction in P is relatively large if:
(i) the demand for P is relatively price elastic; (ii) the output elasticity  of P in the
1 Differentiating  (22)  with  respect  to  x yields  (UXX  - CXx)aX/ak  - Cx =  0,  where  Cx  =
a 2C/8Xa1L  Rearranging,  8X/ax  = CXwD/(UXX  - CXX).  From  duality,  CXy  = aP(a,  iB,  X)/4X,  which
is  posidve  since  P  Is  normal.  From  concavfy,  UXX  - CxXc  0. Hence  aX/lt <  0.
I11production of X is relatively large; and (iii) the cost share of P in production of
X is relatively large'2. The term  l/(a-,i)  S 0 is decreasing in a and
increasing in rq. Hence,  the more price elastic are the supply of X and the
demand for X, the larger is the reduction in P for a given tax, g.  If either a or
ij  is zero, the output effect vanishes and only a substitution  effect remains.
Second-Best Policy:  A Tax on X.  If P cannot be monitored so the tax
instrument  X is unavailable,  a natural alternative is to tax X.  The salient
difference between  the two consumption  goods is that production of X uses  the
environmental input while production of Y does not.  Taxing X has no effect on
relative -input  prices, so production of X takes place along the same isoquant
expansion  path as in the untaxed  regime.  Taxing X discourages its
consumption,  however, and thereby shifts the demand schedule  for  P Inward.
The reduced demand for  P then leaves more of the environmental resource
in Its natural state, to provide the consumption  benefit  V.
To determine the welfare effect of a marginal ad valorem tax on X,
differentiate  (21) with respect to (, and evaluate  where t = X = x = 0:
awwac  = (Ux  - CX)aRX/  - c - VQ{(aP/aX)aX/aQ  + C,
= - V0(aPfPaX)aX/a(}.  (29)
The expression in brackets is a pure output  effect, and the welfare effect of the
tax is positive  if this output effect is negative. Negativity  of the own price
elasticity  of demand for X implies  aX/at < o.  and aP/aX  > 0 since P is normal.1 3
Hence,  a marginal tax on the consumption  good that uses the free access
environmental resource as an input is welfare enhancing. As shown latpr,
12Note  that  elasticities  of  demand  for P refer  to a  constant  ou,ipRt  demand  function.
13The  consumer's  choice  of  X satisfies  Ux  - (1  + CJCx(a,P,X)  =  0. Dffferentiating  this  equation
with  respect  to  4 and  evaluating  at  (=  0  yields,  after  rearranging,  UX/a  =  CX/(UXX  - Cxx)  < 0.
12taxing X is equivalent  to granting a subsidy  for consumption  of Y.  The policy
prescription that emerges thus has intuitive  appeal - tax goods that use the
unpriced input and grant subsidies  to goods that do not. 14
The elasticity expression for the effect of 4  on conversion of the
environmental resource, also derived in the Appendix, is
dp =  X((Y<nl))d;.  (30)
Since 4 is an ad valorem levy, whereas X was per unit, (30) does not contain a
term equivalent  to 1/,B  in (28).
Second-Best Policy:  A Tax on L Used in X.  To obtain  the welfare effect
of a marginal tax on LX,  differentiate (21)  with respect to X and evaluate  the
derivative at X =  = A =0:
aw/ax  = (UX  - Px)axlax  - aclax
- V0{aP/4.  + (aP/aX)  a  X/aX)  + LX,
=  V(aP/ax+ (aP/  aX/IA,  (31)
where use has been made of XC/a = LX. Imposing  a marginal tax on Lx is
welfare enhancing  if the term in brackets is negative. The term aP/WX  is an
input substitution  effect,  the effect of a change in the price of Lx on demand  for
P, so its sign depends on whether P and Lx are complements  or substitutes  in
the production of X.15 The assumption  that P and LX are normal inputs implies
aP/aX > 0 and ax/aX < O.l,
14Lopez  and  Nikltschek  (1991)  reach  a  similar  second-best  policy  conclusion  for the  steady
state  equilibrium  In  their  model.
151n  the  case  depicted  here,  where  only  two  inputs  are  needed  to  produce  X,  the  two  must
necessarily  be  substitutes.  The  model  can  easily  be  generalized  to  involve  rore than  two  Inputs
in  producing  X,  in  which  case  complementarity  cannot  be  ruled  out.
16The  explanation  for 8X/IM  < 0 parallels  the  demonstration  foraX/as  < 0. Differentiating  (22)
with  respect  to  A  yields  (UxX  - CXX)8X/8k  - CX;  =  0, where  CX)  =  a 2C/aX8. Rearranging,
13If Lx and P are complements  in production, then  MW/X  > 0 and
imposing  a positive  tax on Lx is welfare enhancing. The tax has a beneficial
input substitution  effect (aP/i;. < 0), since it causes substitution  toward a less
damaging  mix of inputs for producing each amount of X.  It also has a
beneficial output substitution  effect ((aP/aX)8X/A.  < 0), because  it shifts
consumption  away from the good that uses the polluting  input.
If Lx and P are substitutes,  the welfare effect of a marginal tax on Lx is
unclear.  In this case; the input substitution  effect and output  substitution  effect
work in opposite  directions.  If the input substitution  effect is dominant,  then
welfare is improved by granting a subsidy  for the use of LX.
The elasticity expression for this tax, as shown in the Appendix, is
dP  p  P1  a  (32)
p=( 9a~xX'  (a-,q)~  a
where  0,  is the cross elasticity  of demand for P with respect to the price of LX,
L is the elasticity  of demand for Lx with respect  to output, and  X 0 is the cost
share of Lx in the production of X.  If Lx and P are complements,  a tax on LX
reduces P and the size of the reduction is greater: (i) the less, in algebraic
value, is the cross elasticity  of demand between P and LX,  (ii) the greater are
the elasticities  for LX and P with respect to X, (iii) the greater is the cost share
of input X, and (iv) the more price elastic are the demand and supply functions
for X.
X/ak = CW(UXX  - CX), the  denominator  of which  is negative  by  concaviy. Since  CX -
&LX(ac,  0, X)/8X,  and is posflive  n  LX Is  normal, i follows  that 8X8A.  c 0.
14Discussion
It is useful at this point  to note a number of relationships  between
alternative tax policies. The linearity of production functions  for Y and P imply
that taxing LP is equivalent  to taxing P, and taxing Ly is equivalent  to taxing Y.
This is a special case of a more general result - imposing  equal ad valorem
taxes on all inputs used to produce a good achieves  the same result as a
direct tax on the final product, since marginal cost functions  are
homogeneous  of degree one in input prices.  There may be instances in
which some or all of the inputs used to convert Q are easily monitored, while
the actual conversion process is not.  In such cases, monitoring costs favor a
policy of taxing the inputs rather than the activity.
A number of additional relationships  can be determined quickly, by
examining  how each policy affects the economy's resource constraint, stated
here for convenience  as
aLx + Y . P = a.  (7a)
A first-best tax on P. expressed as an ad valorem levy at rate y, changes  the
budget constraint to
aL+Y+(1  +T)PP=ax+Ry  (7b)
where Ry  is the revenue the tax generates.  Dividing  both sides by (1 + y), the
result is
aLx  Y  a+RY  (7c)
(1+y)  +  (1+y) +I3P=  (7c1
1  5Since (7c) and (7b) describe the same opportunity set, they result in the same
equilibrium allocation.  The policy represented by (7c) involves granting ad
valorem subsidies,  at rate 1 - 1/(1 + y), for consumption  of Y and use of input
LX. This is equivalent  to subsidizing  all inputs except  those used in
deforestation.  While this is presumably unrealistic for any actual economy,
understanding this equivalence  can be useful in assessing the environmental
consequences  of broad tax or subsidy policies,  such as exchange controls
and import protection.
Consider, finally, the effect of a tax on X. Taxing  X is the same as
imposing  equal ad valorem taxes on the inputs used to produce X, Lx and P,
which yields the budget constraint
(1 +  8)aLX + Y + (1 + S)PP = a + R8,  (7d)
where 8 is the tax rate and R8  = 8(aLX  + ,P).  Dividing  both sides by (1 + 8)
yields
axL3+  y  +S),DP(1+R8)  (7e)
which characterizes an ad valorem subsidy, at rate 1 - 1/(1 + 8), for
consumption  of Y, the good that does not use the environmental resource.
These relationships,  as well as the results obtained in the examination
of first-  and second-best policies, are used in the following section to evaluate
the environmental  consequences  of a number of government policies
commonly  adopted in developing economies. The issue of tropical
deforestation is emphasized  in the discussions  of policy, but implications  for
other  resource issues are  examined  as well. 17
17Aithough  the  preceding  model  is static,  it can  be  reinterpreted  to shed  light  on  intertemporal
issues,  at  least  in  certain  instances.  Consider  the  example  of  allocating  a  reserve  of  crude  oil.
Property  rights  to the  in situ  reserve  are  often  relatively  insecure,  possibly  due  to the  rule  of
capture  or for reasons  of  political  instability.  The  reserve  can  be  converted  to an  owned  Input,
available  for use  In  the  present,  by  extracting  ft. The  resuting  allocation  is  not  Pareto  efficient;  ft
16The welfare content of the preceding model rests heavily on the
assumption  that a single unmarketed, and hence misallocated,  environmental
resource is the only source of inefficiency. When combined  with the
assumption  that the economy is initially in an unregulated equilibrium and the
limited welfare goal of identifying marginal welfare improvements, a simple
relationship between  welfare and changes in the misallocated  resource
emerges - marginal increases in Q necessarily yield marginal welfare
gains.  In any actual apptication,  additional  areas of market failure may be
present, and the economy  may suffer other distortions due to taxation,
regulation, or an absence  of competition. For this reason, welfare
implications  are downplayed  in the applications  that follow, and stress is
placed on determining the effect of government policy on the environmental
resource.
Applications
Several government policies  that have received recent attention in the
literature on tropical deforestation are surveyed in this section and analyzed
in terms of the preceding model. In some cases the environmental effects of
these policies  are sufficiently  obvious that a formal model and detailed
analysis is unnecessary. The preceding framework remains useful,
leaves  less  of the resource  in  the  ground  for future  consumption  than  would  be  provided  if in
situ  property  rights  were  secure. (Johaney  (1978)  uses  this  general  argument  to explain  the
worldwide  crude  oil price  increase  that  occurred  in  the  early 1970s.  The  preceding  model
implies  that  welfare  will  be  improved  by  a policy  that  raises  the  private  cost  of converting
(extracting)  it,  since  this  increases  the  amount  available  in  the  future. Imposing  a royalty  or
severance  tax generally  has  this  effect.  On  the  other  hand,  policies  that  further abridge  rights
to future  consumption  worsen  the  misallocation,  and  property  taxes  and  capial  gains  taxes  on
reserves  held  in situ have  this effect.  Second-best  policies  that  explok  either input  or output
substitution  effects  are not  difficult  to imagine.
17however, for  sorting these policies into three categories depending on how
they affect the environmental resource, whether by altering: the cost of
converting it, the relative price of a good that uses it as an input, or the cost of '
an input that is substitutable  or complementary to it.
The  Cost  of Converting  the Environmental  Resource
The cost of converting the environmental resource can be affected by
policies  that tax or subsidize conversion directly, or by policies that change
the cost of inputs used in conversion.  The policies  surveyed in this section
have  such effects.
The Cost of Gaining Access to Trogical Forests. The pace at which
tropical forests are cleared is limited by inaccessibility. An important
determinant of the cost of gaining access and removing any products sought
is the conditon of roads and other transportation facilities. Not surprisingly,
direct government provision of roads to and into tropical fcrests is widely
cited as a major cause of deforestation. 1 s  Construction of a road often leads,
eventually,  to conversion of the forest to shlifting  cultivation. This process often
begins when a road is built to providG access  to a forest for logging.  Logging
results in a network of logging roads, and the road network attracts peasants
seeking land for shifting cultivation. This pattern has been observed in Brazil
(Browder, 1988, p.283), Thailand (Panayotou  and Sungsuwan, 1989, p.30),
the Philippines  (Boado, 1988, pp.169,196)  and elsewhere.
The preceding model used ,B  to represent the marginal cost of
converting the forest, and policies  that subsidize  this cost naturally lead to
18This  specific  phenomenon  has  been  studied  most  thoroughly  in Brazil;  see  Browder  (1988,
pp.251,277-283)  and Mahar (1989,  pp.91-4.  99-101).
1  8more extensive deforestation.  Government provision of access roads and
subsidies to other logging inputs are examples; they provide immediate
access to timber harvesters and later five access to shifting  cultivators.19
Harvested logs must be shipped to the mill before use and this is costly as
well.  Government provision of roads and rail lines, if used primarily for
hauling logs and other forest products to market, have environmental effects
similar to provision of access roads.  They reduce the private cost of
deforestation and hence hasten  the process. 20
Some observers cite the provision of transportation infrastructure  in
general, including  canals and harbors, as a source of deforestation.  If these
transportation facilities are also used by sectors that do not use the
environmental input, then their environmental effects are  ambiguous. Using
the language of the preceding section, if the government builds a that road
lowers the cost of P but subsidizes  production of Y at the same time, the two
considerations work in opposite  directions.  The direction of the net effect
cannot be determined without knowledge  of relevant elasticities and cost
shares.  To determine it one would need to compute the implied  subsidy rate
19Panayotou  and  Sungsuwan  (1989,  pp.4,5)  include  the  price  of logging  inputs  and  factors  that
represent  accessibility  to  the  forest  among  the  marginal  cost  items  that  determine  the  rate  of
logging.
20The  model  in  the  preceding  section  considered  only  policies  that  affect  the  prices  of all  Inputs
used  in  converting  the  forest.  If  there  are  two  inputs,  e.g.,  roads  and  labor  for harvesting
timber,  and  the  price  of  only  one  of  these  is  affected,  then  the  effect  on  marginal  conversion
cost  is  given  by  do/f = OP  IcoPd/evl.  Here,  P(ei ,e2)  is the  marginal  cost  of  conversion,  assumed
independent  of output,  el and  e 2 are prices  of inputs  used  in  conversion,  i signifies  the  input
whose  price  is  changed,  I is  the  elasticity  of  demand  for input  i with  respect  to P,  and  i  is  the
cost  share  of input  i in  the  conversion  process.  Thus,  the  effect  on  marginal  cost  of subsidizing
a  given  input  depends  on  the  inpurs  cost  share  and  output  elasticity  in  the  conversion  process.
19for P and for Y, and then combine  equations  (28) and (30) to determine the
effect on p.21
Royalties  and  Taxes. The  most  common  form of payment  specified  in
contracts  to harvest  timber from government  forests is the royalty,  assessed
either on a per unit  or ad valorem  basis. The  severance  tax, in either per
unit or ad valorem forms, is another  common  revenue  instrument  and its
incentive  effects are  identical.22  If the environmental damage that results from
timber harvests  is uniquely  related  to the amount  of wood harvested,  so P can
be represented  by the size of the harvest,  then both royalties  and severance
taxes  act as first-best policies. Both  lower  the profit earned  on any ½ogs
harvested,  and hence  reduce pressure  to extend  deforestation.
Royalties,  whether  expressed  as a fraction of the value  of the log at the
mill  or as a fixed  charge per cubic  foot removed,  eliminate  the incentive  to
remove  stems  that would  be on the margin  of profitability  absent  the royalty.
Since  the timber left behind  is of relatively  low  quality,  this phenomenon  known
as 'high-grading'. 23 High-grading  increases  the area of  ..  1land
disturbed  per unit of timber harvested.  This  disturbance  can lead  to the
scarring of unharvested  stems  and  to damage  in the form of erosion  and
siltation.
Several  authors  have  argued  that royalties  and taxes,  by causing
high-grading,  are important  sources  of deforestation. Repetto  (1988a,  pp.
21Assessing  the  effect  on  welfare  seems  particularly  difficult  in  this  case,  in  part  because  the
facilities  involved  may  have  public  good  attributes.
22Royalties  and  severance  taxes  are  commonly  levied  on  mineral  extraction  as  well.
23Vincent  (1990)  provides  empirical  evidence  on  the  importance  of royalties  in induc  e high-
grading  in  Indonesia.  A  severance  tax  obviously  has  the  same effect  and  tax-inducea  nigh-
grading  has  been  noted  in  the  general  literature  on  the  economics  of forestry;  see,  for
example,  Gaffney  (1975)  and  Deacon  (1985,  pp.  299-300).
2018, 24) provides a general statement, Boado (1988, pp. 180-181) gives
evidence regarding the Philippines,  and Gillis (1988a,  p. 59, 1988b, p. 128,
and 1988c,  pp. 322-332) kpplies this reasoning to Indonesia, Malaysia,  and
Liberia.
While a royalty can induce high-grading, and high-grading increases
the acreage of forestland disturbed for each unit of wood harvested, it does
not follow that a royalty causes deforestation. 24 A royalty has the same effect
on the harvesting decision as a reduction in the mill value of each stem in the
forest. If the harvesting decision for each stem is motivated  by harvesting
profits, then the effective price reduction cannot increase the number of
stems harvested.  If the demand for logs is highly elastic, as is likely if they are
harvested for export, then the harvester's price net of royalty will fall by
roughly the amount of the royalty, reducing the incentive  to harvest all
stems. 25 If demand is relatively inelastic,  on the other hand,  the royalty will
simply be passed through to buyers, and have no effect on the price net of
royalty or the harvesting decision. 26 In either case,  stems that would be left
unharvested absent the royalty remain unharvested when the royalty is
imposed.
One can imagine alternative revenue instruments that avoid the high-
grading phenomenon. One might define the base for royalty payments  as the
mill value of logs less all costs of harvest.  If perfectly implemented,  the
resulting royalty base equals the stumpage  value of standing  timber, and any
24Repetto  (1988a,  p.24)  seems  to conclude  that royaities  cause  deforestation  and  Gillis  (1988b,
p. 130)  argues  that  royalties  worsen  logging  damage  and  accentuate  forest  depletion  in
Malaysia.
25Panayotou  and  Sungsuwan  (1989)  confirn  this  negative  price  effect  empirically  and  quantify
the  responsiveness  of deforestation  to changes  In  timber  prices  in  northeast  Thailand.
26Repetto  (1988a,  p.  24)  and  Glulls  (1988b,  p. 130)  seem  to have  the  inelastic  demand  case  In
mind  when  they  speak  of  the  harvest  required  to  fulfill  demand  or obtain  a  given  output.
21stem worth  harvesting absent  the royalty remains profitable to harvest with
the levy.  Such a royalty has no effect  on the choice of stems actually  cut, and is
not a source of high-grading.  Computing eligible harvest costs would
presumably be difficult.  An alternative is to sell rights to harvest particular
tracts of timber through a competitive  bidding process, where bidders offer
lump sum payments  rather than charges per unit of timber removed.  Again,
the process of collecting revenue would not be a source of high-grading.
Bl' avoiding high-grading, these neutral revenue instruments would
reduce the area of land disturbed per unit wood removed.  This does not
imply that they would slow deforestation, however.  If perfectly implemented
they would leave unaffected  the profit-maximizing harvest decision for each
stem.  Hence,  all stems harvested in the absence  any royalty would remain
profitable to harvest with either of these neutral revenue Instruments. As
noted earlier,  a simple ad valorem or  per  unit royalty renders subeconomic
some stems that would be harvested with a neutral scheme,  and thus reduces
the  volume  cut. 27
Log  Exoort  Controls.  Developing  countries  often  limit  log  exports  to
promote  domestic  processing  of  tropical  timber. Some  have  argued  that  this
accelerates  deforestation  and  the  reasoning  used  has  two  parts. First,  an
export  ban  causes  timber  to be processed  in domestic  rather  than  foreign
mills,  and  domestic  mills  tend  to be relatively  inefficient  in the  sense  that  they
require  more  timber  to produce  a given  output  of wood  products.  Second,
27The  choice  of royalty  rates  and  instruments  also  affects  the  distributon  of  the  rent  that  forest
harvesting  can  provide.  Gilils  and  Repetto  (1988)  conclude  that  Increasing  the  share  of rent
going  to  the  nominal  government  owner  is  desirable  per  se. Hyde  and  Sedjo  (1992)  argue  that
it is  an  empirical  question  whether  the  national  economy  and  local  populations  gain  more  from
government  or private  capture  of this  rent.
22once domestic mills are established,  the host government tends to maintain
timber harvests at whatever level is needed  to keep the mills running,
regardless of costs and benefits. Gillis has applied this argument to Malaysia
(Gillis, 1988b, p. 138), Indonesia  (Gillis, 1988a,  pp. 69-71), the Ivory Coast,
and to Uberia and Ghana in lesser degrees (Gillis, 1988c, pp. 337-341).
Gillis (1988a,  p. 69) reaches a similar conclusion  for log export taxes,
arguing that a 20 percent export tax on logs, with no export tax on wood
products, significantly  increases the rate of deforestation in Indonesia.
Repetto (1988a,  p. 18, and 1989,  pp. 81-82) provides concise summary
statements  of this view.
Prohibiting log exports eliminates  foreign mills as a source of log
demand. This lowers the stumpage  value of timber in much the same way a
tax would. Sedjo and Wiseman  (1983, pp.113-4) and Parks and Cox (1985, p.
250) reach the same conclusion  in their analysis of export prohibitions on
loge taken from federal land in the U.S. So long as the pressure to harvest is
positively related to the profit from harvesting, the export ban should reduce,
not increase, the pace of logging and deforestation. 28
Political pressure to keep employment  high at inefficient  domestic mills
evidently  exists and might be strong enough  to outweigh  the economic
pressure for a lower harvest that comes from the reduction in stumpage
value. 29 If so, the export ban would accelerate deforestation.  It is fruitless to
argue this point on conceptual  grounds, however, since the question is
28!f banning  exports caused  an  unchanged  volume  of lunbe.-to  be  produced  in  inefficient
domestic  mills  rather  than  etficient  foreign  ones,  then  the  rate  of  deforestation  clearly  would
rise. This  would  not  be  the  market  response  to an  export  ban,  however.  The  ban  reduces  the
total  demand  for logs  and  reduces  in  the  total  volume  of lumber  produced.
290nce  built,  the  cost  of  such  mills  is  sunk  and  becomes  irrelevant  in  short  run  decisions  of
whether  and  at  what  rate  to  keep  them  operating,  a  consideration  that  adds  plausibility  to  the
argument.
23essentially  empirical,  and to date  the necessary  empirical  analysis  has not
been performed.
Policies That  Alter the Mix of Final Products
Conversion  of the environmental  resource Is discouraged  by policies
that retard production  of the good  that uses  the environmental  input. The
same  end  can be reached  by subsidizing  consumption  of the good  that  does
not use  the environmental  input. While  this is a useful  generalization,  the first
of the following  examples  indicates  that it must  be applied  with care.
General Agricultural Policies. Governments  in developing  countries
commonly  adopt  policies  that keep  farm prices low relative  to prices of other
outputs;  see Repetto  (1  988b,  p. 171),  Schramm  and Warford (1  989a,  p. 14),
and  Warford (August  1987,  p. 19). This  end  can be accomplished  by direct
price control,  by high  tax rates  on farm products  or, as noted  later, by
overvaluing  a country's  currency or protecting  its manufacturing  sector. An
obvious  effect  is to reduce  the demand  for agricultural  inputs,  particularly
farmland. If conversion  of land  to agriculture  is inimical  to the environment,
as is widely  claimed  for conversion  of tropical  forests,  then  such policies  are
environmentally  benign,  at least  along  this dimension.
In some  developing  countries  the net force of government  policy  runs
in the opposite  direction,  and subsidizes  production  of at least  some
agricultural  products. The leading  example  is the system  of tax credits,  tax
exemptions,  and credit subsidies  provided  by the Brazilian  government  for
cattle  ranching  in the Amazon;  see Browder  (1988,  pp. 251-255,  257 ff.),
Repetto  (1989,  p. 83),  and Binswanger  (1989,  pp. 3,6,11). These  policies  are
credited  with almost  three-fourths of the Brazilian  deforestation  that had
24taken place by the early 1980s (Browder, 1988,  p. 251 ff.).  Gillis t1  988, p.
347) reaches a similar conclusion regarding government incentives for  rice
production in Liberia.  In a nonagricultural example, Mahar (1989) argues
against subsidies  to mining in Brazil, which use charcoal made by harvesting
wood from the forest, as an input.
Armed with such examples  it is tempting to conclude  that promotion of
agriculture harms tropical forests, because it leads to their conversion.
Such broad generalizations ignore differences in the production
technologies  and inputs used by different crops and farming practices,
however.  A subtle observation on this point was made by Panayotou  and
Sungsuwan  (1989, p.31 ff), who studied the causes of deforestation in
Thailand. Land converted from tropical forest typically is used for
agriculture, which seemingly supports the preceding generalization.  The
authors found, however, that  while high prices for upland crops promote
deforestation, higher rice prices impede it.  Upland  crops (cassava, maize,
and kenap) are  more intensive  than rice in their use of converted forestland,
so a shift toward growing rice draws farm labor away from upland crops
and thereby the reduces the extent of deforestation. Lopez (1992, pp. 24-25)
makes  essentially  the same point when commenting  on the possibility  of
differentially taxing agricultural outputs as a second-best way to correct  for
inefficiency  in agricultural land use.
Policies that discriminate against agriculture may also influence the
method  of farming.  Imposing  price controls or taxes could shift farm
production toward food grown for home consumption  and for sale in black
markets to escape taxation or  regulation. This possibility  is speculative  since
it has not been examined  In detail in the literature.  It seems likely, however,
that farm products grown for  home consumption  or  illegal markets are more
25frequently produced by shifting agriculture, a practice that is particularly
damaging  to forests, than those produced for legal trade. 30
Trade Poligy.  Developing  countries often overvalue their currencies,
reducing the prices domestic producers receive for  sales abroad and thus
depressing exports.  The comparative advantage  of most developing
countries lies in agriculture and natural resource  products, so exchange
controls typically discourage these sectors relative to manufacturing.
Evidence and further  elaboration are  provided by Repetto (1988a, p. 23),
Gillis (1988a, pp. 78-81), Gillis (1988c,  pp. 305,343), and Gillis and Repetto
(1988, p. 403).  If the primary environmental concern is deforestation, then
the model presented.  earlier  allows a useful generalization.  If agriculture
and natural resource industries rely on inputs acquires by converting
forestlands, while manufacturing  does not, then exchange  controls tend to
reduce the pace of deforestation. 31
Trade  patterns in developing countries also are  influenced by tariffs
and quotas. Quotas and taxes on log exports, intended  to protect domestic
processors, were examined earlier  and found to retard  deforestation.
301t  is  also  argued  that  policies  that  depress  agriculture,  such  as  taxes,  price  controls,  and
exchange  controls,  lower  incentives  to invest  in  farmland  improvement,  and  thereby  cause
erosion,  salinization,  and  nutrient  depletion  (Warford,  August  1987,  p. 19). If  so,  then  at least
some  kinds  of agricuitural  Inputs,  e.g.,  those  related  to soil  conservation,  are environmentally
beneficial.  Again,  the  net  relationship  between  the  pace  of agricuture  and  the  condition  of  the
environment  is  difficult  to  determine.  I:  depends  on  the  crops  that  are  farmed,  the  nature  of  the
local  environment,  and  the  kinds  of environmental  damages  one  measures.
31Gillis  (1988a,  pp.  78-81)  argues  that  overvaluation  of  the  Indonesian  rupiah  accelerated  the
rate  of tropical  deforestation  in  that  country  by  depressing  prices  of  export  crops  harvested
from  uncut  forasts,  thereby  reducing  the  incentive  to leave  these  forests  standing.  In  Malaysia,
on  the  o'her  hand,  Gillis  (1988b.  p. 101)  concludes  that  tropical  deforestation  was  hastened  by
undervaluation  of  the  Malaysian  dollar  (or ringget),  because  i accelerated  log  exports.  For
both  claims  to  be  accurate  i must  be  true  that  forest  crop  exports,  not  logs,  are  the  main  source
of  profit  and  hence  the  primary  factor  In  the  harvesting  decision  for Indonesia's  forests,  while
logging  is  of  primary  importance  in  Malaysia.
26Other measures used to protect domestic  manufacturers and raw materials
processors include tariffs on imports of finished manufactured  goods and
subsidies  for domestic manufacturers and processors, such as lumber mills
and petroleum refineries.  Subsidizing  a sector that does not use inputs from
forest conversion diverts the economy's  labor away from deforestation.
Some manufacturing  industries seem to satisfy this condition, but others
clearly do not.
Developing  countries use both log export controls and subsidies  to
protect domestic processors from foreign competition. Subsidies  to
processors take the form of tax credits, tax holidays,  and subsidized loans
(Repetto 1988a, pp. 17-18).  While processing subsidies  and log export bans
both offer protection from foreign competition,  their implications  for
deforestation are completely  different.  A subsidy  to domestic  processors
leaves the foreign demand for logs unaffected,  but increases the profits of
domestic processors and thereby increases their demand for logs.  This
intensifies  the  incentive  to harvest and hastens  deforestation. A log export
ban, on the other hand, reduces the overall demand for  logs.
Emoloyment Opoortunities. General poverty among landless peasants
has been cited as an important cause of deforestation.  Lacking  other
employment opportunities, such workers often turn to converting forestland
to shifting cultivation,  particularly after it has been logged. One way to relieve
this pressure on forests is to subsidize  or otherwise promote employment
and production in industries that do not convert forestlands to obtain inputs.
In commenting on deforestation in Brazil, Mahar (1989, p.12) essentially
makes the same point when recommending  that the Brazilian government
27increase employment  opportunities  in sectors and geographic  areas
unconnected  to the Amazon  forests.
Policies That  Alter the Mix of Inputs
Changing  the price of an input  generally  changes  both  the mix of inputs
used  to produce  a given  level  of Output  and  the mix  of final outputs  consumed.
Subsidizing  a substitute  for an input  obtained  by deforestation  may  cause  use
of the forest-related input;  and hence  deforestation,  to rise or fall, depending
on the relevant  elasticities  and  cost  shares. Subsidizing  a complement,  on the
other hand,  necessarily  hastens  deforestation.
Substitution  Among  Fuels. A leading  cause  of forest degradation  in
densely  populated  tropical regions  Is the gathering  of fuelwood  for heating,
cooking,  and lighting. The  problem  is particularly  acute  in Nepal  and on Java,
where it leads  to soil  depletion  and  erosion  (Pitt, 1985,  p. 201);  it has  also
been  noted  by Panayotou  and Sungsuwan  (1989)  in Thailand. Elsewhere,
Warford (1987,  p. 4) notes  that  the use of dung  for fuel also  depletes  the  soil.
There  are a number  of substitutes  for these  natural fuels  such  as electricity,
coal, and refined petroleum. Granting  subsidies  for one or more substitute
energy sources would  induce  desirable  input  substitution,  and reduce
fuelwood  use per unit  of final  output. 32 If this input  substitution  effect  were not
outweighed  by an adverse  output  substitution  effect,  the rate of deforestation
would  fall as a result.
The Indonesian  government  subsidized  kerosene  for many  years, and
the possibility  of a beneficial  effect  on deforestation  was offered  as one
321n  this  case  the  relevant  'outputs'  are residential  heat,  light,  and  cooked  food.
28rationale.  Pitt (1985)  and Dick (1980) conclude  that the subsidy  did little to
prevent deforestation, however, since the two fuels are  not highly
substitutable  among those populations  who inhabit the rural  areas where
deforestation  occurs.  Panayotou  and Sungsuwan  (1989), on the other hand,
found the extent of "forest cover" in Thailand  to be negatively  related to the
price of kerosene, which agrees with the general line of reasoning advanced
here. 33 The disparity in these findings highlights  the value of information on
relevant elasticities in forming policy.  Ideally, policy formulation would
proceed by empirically assessing the most important uses of fuelwood,
quantifying substitution  possibilities,  and targeting specific alternative energy
sources for subsidies.34
Substitution  Among Agricultural Inputs.  Changing  the price of an input
that is complementary  to the forest-related input can be examined
symmetrically. Stavins  and Jaffe (1990) have applied this reasoning to the
conversion of forested wetlands  in the U.S. to agriculture.  They point out that
forested wetlands provide unmarketed services, such as wildlife habitat and
33The  presence  of collinearity  ff  their  econiometric  model  made  it  difficult  to  separate  the  effect
of  kerosene  price  from  the  influence  of  other  variables  that  determine  deforestation.
34A similar  analysis  could  be  applied  to examine  the  effects  of  taxes  or subsidies  for  capital  used
in  processing  logs,  mineral  ores,  and  other  natural  resources.  Milling  capital  and  logs  appear
substitutable  In  the  oroduction  of filnshed  lumber.  When  milling  capial  Is  cheap  production
seems  capital  Intensive  and  'efficient'  In  the  sense  of requiring  a small  volume  of  timber  to
produce  a  given  output.  A subsidy  to milling  capital  would,  by  this  reasoning,  reduce  the  use  of
logs  relative  to  milling  capital,  a  favorable  input  substitution  effect.  It  would  also  cause  an
opposing  output  substitution  effect,  so  a careful  determination  of relevant  cost  shares  and
elasticities  would  be  needed  to  deternmine  the  net  outcome.  As  the  logic  of equation  (32) implIes,
a  subsidy  to  milling  capital  might  actually  hasten  deforestation  n  the  output  effect  is  dominant.
The  same  reasoning  applies  to  processing  mined  ores  In  cases  where  the  environmental  harm
of concern  Is  directly  related  to  the  volume  of  ore removed.  It  Is  useful  to reiterate  the
difference  between  a subsidy  to processing  capital  and  a  general  subsidy  to  the  processing
activity.  The  latter  has  no  benefeial  Input  soibsttutlon  effect,  and  hence  unambiguously
increases  extraction  of  the  raw  material.
29visual amenities. Agricultural crops are  produced with cleared land and
other farm inputs.  Most of these other inputs appear complementary to land,
such  as irrigation water, fertilizers, pest control agents, and flood protection
for farmland.  Hence.subsidies  for these inputs imply a pattern of input and
output substitution  effects that hastens  deforestation. 35 Stavins  and Jaffe's
(1990) empirical analysis focuses on the effect of free flood protection for
farmland, and their simulations  indicate that this policy has been a significant
cause of deforestation and wetland conversion.  Their empirical analysis also
examines subsidies  to irrigation water, which tends to enhance forest
conversion, and controls on the use of agricultural pesticides,  which appear
to retard it.
Government subsidies for agricultural inputs are also observed in the
developing world and the items typically favored include pesticides,  fertilizers,
irrigation water, and farm machinery; see Repetto (1989, pp. 73-77),
Schramm and Warford (1989, p. 15), and Warford (1987, pp. 20-22).  The
subsidies take various forms:  direct payments  to users of pesticides,  below
cost sales of irrigation water by government agencies, and favorable tariff
treatment for farm machinery. 36 Such policies  cause output substitution  that
hastens  deforestation  - they reduce the marginal cost of an activity,
agriculture, that often uses converted forestland as an input.  They also cause
substitution between farmland and other agricultural inputs, however, and
this effect could either augment  or offset the output substitution  effect. While
some empirical information on the direction and magnitudes  of these effects is
available,  e.g., Stavins  and Jaffe (1990) for the U.S. and Panayotou  and
35Panayotou  and  Sungsuwan  (1989),  in  their  study  of northeast  Thailand,  find  a similar
deforestation  effect  from  government  provision  of irrigation  improvements.
36Warford  (1987,  p.  20)  reports  a median  subsidy  rate  of  44  percent  of  cost  for pesticides  used
in  a sample  of developing  countries.
30Sungsuwan  (1989) for Thailand, knowledge  on this subject of relatively
incomplete. 37
Conclusions
The importance of property  rights, though important for
understanding the process of tropical deforestation, does not necessarily
point to a simple or  straightforward fix for environmental problems,
particularly in developing countries.  Regarding tropical forests specifically,
their sheer size, the communal nature of their service flows, and the
pervasiveness  of individual access  to them, make monitoring and
enforcement  very costly in some situations and virtually unimaginable  in
others.  Redefining  nominal rights in ways that appear to correct
inefficiencies  may yield gains in some instances,  but an approach to
environmental protection that leans heavily on this prescription seems aimed
more at symptoms  than causes.  Furthermore, while policy approaches
based on the use of Pigovian  taxes or  marketable permit schemes  may yield
efficiency  gains in some instances,  they generally encounter the same
monitoring and enforcement problems that prevent the market from solving
these allocation problems.
If simple, direct solutions  to deforestation and other environmental
problems in developing countries are  unavailable,  an ability to understand
the environmental and welfare consequences  of policies adopted for other
37The  use  of  fossil  fuels  as  a source  of energy  to produce  manufactured  goods  provides  an
additional  application  of  this  general  framework.  The  use  of  fossil  fuels  degrades  an
environmental  resource,  clean  air.  In  effect,  clean  air,  or the  waste-receptive  capacity  of  the
atmosphere,  is an  input  to  the  production  of  manufactured  goods.  Fossil  fuels  are
complementary  to the  use  of  this  environmental  input;  hence  the  typical  government  policy  of
subsidizing  use  of  fossil  fuels  promotes  air pollution  and  lowers  welfare.  Kosmo  (1989)
provides  information  on  air pollution  and  energy  price  policy  in  several  developing  nations.
31reasons  is useful,  if only to help  policy  makers  -avoid  mistakes  that might
otherwise  go unrecognized.  The model  developed  for this purpose  is highly
stylized,  and is intended  primarily  to provide  a systematic  way of thinking
about  the environmental  and welfare  effects  of government  policy,  e.g.,  by
considering  patterns  of substitution  among  inputs  and outputs,  In cases  where
an environmental  resource is exploited  under condiftons  of free access. The
policy  applications  examined  were not studied  in any detail,  and  sometimes
were stated  in terms so simple  that  a model  seems  unnecessary.  In any
actual  situation,  however,  pursuing  a specific  government  policy  can affect  a
variety  of Industries  to different  degrees  and may reallocate  resources  in a
way that protects some  environmental  resources  and simultaneously
degrades  others. If the use of first-best policies  is infeasible,  whether  due  to
monitoring  costs,  transboundary  effects,  or other reasons,  then detailed
knowledge  of patterns  of substitution  and complementarity  among  ordinary
inputs  and environmental  resources,  and information  on the use of various
environmental  resources  in the production  of specific  goods  and services
become  important. Knowieors  of such  factors  can permit policy  makers  to
pursue policy  goals  in situations  where  first-best instruments  are
unavailable.
32Appendix
When  taxes  on P, L%,  and  X are considered,  the  demand  for P is
expressed
P=P(ac+,  X3+  X,  X).  (A.1)
The  consumer's  choice  of X satisfihes
UX  = (1  + Q)Cx(a  + X, P  + Xc,  X),  (A.2)
which implies
X=X(a+X,  5+X):-  (A.3)
The  effect  of a marginal  tax on P, levied  at rate  x, on the equilibrium
value  of P is found  by incorporating  (A.3)  in (A.1)  and  differentiating  with
respect  to xc
dP  aP  a  (aX  (A-4)
To evaluate  the  term aX  insert  (A.3)  into (A.2)  and differentiate  with respect  to
I.  Evaluating  at xC  = x=  =  yields
*ax
=X uxx-Cxx
ap. 1  A5
= axuxx  -cx)  (A.5)
It is useful  to relate  the expression  1/(Uxx  - Cxx) to ordinary price
elasticities  of demand  and supply. Suppose  the consumer's  utility
maximization  problem  were intermediated  by a market,  so output  X is sold
competitively  at price R and is bought  be a price-taking  consumer. The
necessary  conditions  for utility and profit maximization  become
Ux(X)  = R  (A.6)
CX(a,  ,B,  X)  = R.  (A.7)
These  conditions  can  be inverted  to yield  X = XD(R)  and X = XS(c P,.  R),
respectively,  which  are competitive  demand  and  supply  functions.
33Incorporating  these  demand  and supply  functions  into  .(A.6)  and (A.7)
respectively,  and differentiating  with respect  to R, yields
1  aX 0(R)
uxx  AR  (A.8)
1  aXS(a,  13,  R)  (A.8)
Cxx  aR
With  some  manipulation,  it can be shown  that
1  XALs
Uxx  - CXX R(:  - Tl)  ~~~~~~~(A.9)
where ii and a are price elasticities  of demand  and supply  of X.
It is now  possible  to combine  (A.4),  (A.5)  and (A.9)  to obtain
dP  aP  aPaP  X  c
dn  ar  +  (A.10)
This  can be expressed  in a form involving  elasticities  which  yields  the
proportionate  change  in P for a marginal  tax X
1dP  =  taxi  [ cxx  (A.1  1  )
Evaluating  at X = 0, and  simplifying,  this becomes
IdP  = (DOp  +  X 2  p_  dx  (A.12)
where OP  Is the own  price elasticity  of demand  for P, 4  is the elasticity  of
demand  for P with respect  to output,  and  C°x  is the cost  share of input  P In  the
production  of X.
Taking  a parallel  approach,  the effect  of a tax on Lx levied  at rate X can
be shown  to equal
IdP = (Op  WPOL,  U}  a  (A.13)
34where Op Is the cross elasticity  of demand  for P with respect to a, XL  is the
elasticity  of demand for Lx with respect to output, and  L is the cost share of Lx
in production of X.
Finally,  the effect on P of a marginal tax on X, levied at rate 4, can be
derived In similar fashion.  Inserting (A.3) into (A.1), differentiatingiwith
respect to 4, and evaluating  where  x  =  X-  = 0 gives
ap apax  (A.  14)
The term aX/a  is evaluated  by plugging  (A.3) into (A.2) and differentiating.
After  rearranging, the result is
ax  cx
uX_  cxx  (A.  15)
4UXX  - Cxx
Combining  (A.9), (A.14) and (A.15)  gives
RC  = ;)>cs  Lpv  (A.  16)
This can be arranged to yield an elasticity expression similar to those
provided  earlier
p =  - ,d4.-  (A.1  7)
Recall that 4 is an advalorem levy, whereas X and X are per unit taxes.
Hence  the form of (A.17)  does not contain a term similar to 1/a or  1/J in
(A.13) and (A.12).
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